The democracy principle in state constitutions

Abstract

In recent years, antidemocratic behavior has rippled across the nation. Lame-duck state legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors of their pow-ers; extreme partisan gerrymanders have warped representative institutions; state officials have nullified popularly adopted initiatives. The federal Constitution offers few resources to address these problems, and ballot-box solutions cannot work when antidemocratic actions undermine elections themselves. Commentators increasingly decry the rule of the many by the few. This Article argues that a vital response has been neglected. State constitutions embody a deep commitment to democracy. Unlike the federal Constitu-tion, they were drafted—and have been repeatedly rewritten and amended— to empower popular majorities. In text, history, and structure alike, they ex-press a commitment to popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality. We shorthand this commitment the democracy principle and de-scribe its development and current potential. The Article’s aims are both theoretical and practical. At the level of theory, we offer a new view of American constitutionalism, one in which the majori-tarian commitment of states’ founding documents complements the antima-joritarian tilt of the national document. Such complementarity is an unspoken premise of the familiar claim that the federal Constitution may temper excesses and abuses of state majoritarianism. We focus on the other half of the equation: state constitutions may ameliorate national democratic shortcomings. At the level of practice, we show how the democracy principle can inform a number of contemporary conflicts. Reimagining recent cases concerning electoral interference, political entrenchment, and more, we argue that it is time to reclaim the state constitutional commitment to democracy.