Revisiting the normative framework of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the context of evidence obtained through human rights violations: Has it served its purpose?

Abstract

This article examines the normative context of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, and whether it serves its purpose. It unpacks the concept of a norm and uses the liberal school of thought as the theoretical framework, which informs the adoption of legal norms at the regional level. These, in turn, provide a yardstick that is used to evaluate the efficacy of the norms. With the aid offour normative developments between 1992 and 2003, it evaluates the extent to which these developments serve their purpose in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It is argued that while the Tunis Resolution and the Dakar Declaration have not served the purpose of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, the Robben Island Guidelines specifically dealt with evidence obtained through torture. The adoption of the Principles can be reconciled with the African Commission's approach to the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations.