Antipaternalism as a Filter on Reasons

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Abstract

The charge of paternalism is a common objection to the actions of political and other authorities. Sometimes the charge is only that the authority has undervalued typical liberal values like freedom and autonomy relative to other values, such as physical, mental or financial wellbeing. Making this objection is consistent with accepting that in some cases, wellbeing outweighs freedom and autonomy and should be furthered at their expense. Other times, however, the charge of paternalism is more principled. The objection is not that wellbeing considerations are overstated, but that they are allowed to weigh in on the matter at all. This is the sort of antipaternalism that I will analyze in this article. My discussion and my proposals are meant to be helpful to the antipaternalist, and to anyone who wants to understand her. However, I should state at the outset that the antipaternalist position I describe and develop is not one I endorse.

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Grill, K. (2015). Antipaternalism as a Filter on Reasons. In Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Vol. 35, pp. 47–63). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17960-5_4

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