Russia’s War in Chechnya: The Discourse of Counterterrorism and the Legitimation of Violence

Abstract

In September 1999, Russian troops, purportedly responding to warlord Shamil Basayev’s incursion into the neighboring republic of Dagestan, moved into Chechnya. From the outset, the “second” Chechen war1 was marked by extreme violence, most of which was directed at civilians. Grozny, the capital, sustained five months of heavy bombardment, while the inhabitants took shelter in cellars or risked their lives attempting to flee the city.2 Accounts of summary executions, arbitrary arrests and torture in “filtration camps” began to appear as soon as Russian forces entered Grozny in February 2000; these activities were so widespread and systematic that talk of war crimes and crimes against humanity was not unwarranted.3 Despite the so-called “normalization” process that began in 2003, the violations continued; the “Chechenization” of the conflict has done little more than gradually transfer responsibility from federal troops to pro-Russian militias led by Chechnya’s strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov.