The relationship between philosophy and neuroscience from dan zahavi's phenomenology of mind

Abstract

The bridge between psychiatry and neuroscience is not the only one we have to build; it is also necessary to narrow the gap between neuroscience and philosophy. This does not imply reducing the latter to the former or vice versa, but rather linking the two without eliminating their individual characteristics. Taking that into account, Dan Zahavi's phenomenology of mind can make a great contribution by presenting itself as a different option within philosophy of mind, which up until the last few years was dominated by the analytic tradition. In this chapter, I present Zahavi's proposal in four steps. First, I clarify the term phenomenology. This choice is not accidental, because nowadays this concept is used by diverse traditions and with different meanings. Second, I make the fundamental distinction between first-person perspective-which corresponds to phenomenology-and third-person perspective-compatible with neuroscience. Third, I explain the methodological stages assumed by Zahavi from the Husserlian tradition. These stages enable him to study from the firstperson perspective rigorously: Epoché, phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and intersubjective verification. Finally, I develop the issue of naturalization of phenomenology in order to establish a dialogue between science and philosophy. For Zahavi that naturalization does not necessarily imply reductionism, but can be understood as something necessary for a fruitful exchange between those disciplines.