Accountable assertion enables a payer to make off-chain payments to a payee, and at the same time, the payer’s secret credentials can be revealed if she equivocates (i.e., makes conflicting statements to others). In this paper, we introduce a new construction of accountable assertion that allows an assertion to be accountable for k times. We also present a new construction of anonymous payment channels for the cryptocurrency Bitcoin that allows a payer with k-time accountable assertions to anonymously make off-chain payments to the payee. In particular, we define formal security models for the new constructions, we also prove that the k-time assertion can achieve strong secrecy, and the asynchronous payment channel can achieve anonymity and untraceability. The proposed anonymous payment channel with k-time accountable assertions ensures that: (1) the payee can anonymously receive funds at asynchronous points of sale, and (2) the payee can trace the real identities of payers when they equivocate, and penalize them afterward.
CITATION STYLE
Tian, Y., Li, Y., Sengupta, B., Li, N., & Yu, Y. (2019). Anonymous Asynchronous Payment Channel from k-Time Accountable Assertion. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11829 LNCS, pp. 512–524). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31578-8_28
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