Abstract
In this chapter I defend Explanationist Evidentialism, the theory developed and argued for in Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, from the objections raised by Richard Fumerton, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Matthias Steup. Ultimately, I conclude that although each of these philosophers presents interesting challenges, none of the challenges succeed in undermining Explanationist Evidentialism. It remains a viable theory of epistemic justification:
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McCain, K. (2018). Explanationist Evidentialism: A Defense. In Synthese Library (Vol. 398, pp. 375–391). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_22
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