Padding oracle attack on PKCS#1 v1.5: Can non-standard implementation act as a shelter?

Abstract

In the past decade, Padding Oracle Attacks (POAs) have become a major threat to PKCS#1 v1.5. Although the updated scheme (OAEP) has solved this problem, PKCS#1 v1.5 is still widely deployed in various real-life applications. Among these applications, it is not hard to find that some implementations do not follow PKCS#1 v1.5 step-by-step. Some of these non-standard implementations provide different padding oracles, which causes standard POA to fail. In this paper, we show that although these implementations can avoid the threat of standard POA, they may still be vulnerable to POA in some way. Our study mainly focuses on two cases of non-standard implementations. The first one only performs the "0x00 separator" check in the decryption process; while the other one does not check for the second byte. Although standard POA cannot be directly applied, we can still build efficient padding oracle attacks on these implementations. Moreover, we give the mathematical analysis of the correctness and performance of our attacks. Experiments show that, one of our attacks only takes about 13 000 oracle calls to crack a valid ciphertext under a 1024-bit RSA key, which is even more efficient than attacks on standard PKCS#1 v1.5 implementation. We hope our work could serve as a warning for security engineers: secure implementation requires joint efforts from all participants, rather than simple implementation tricks. © Springer International Publishing 2013.