Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment

Abstract

In this study, game theory was used to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around the Southern Sonkhla Lake where southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of non-cooperative game theory for investigating fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and with individual quotas (IQ), and co-management with ITQs and with IQ. The analysis examined responses under high and low fish stocks that arise due to seasonal salinity in the Lake. Higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. With management options, a co-management policy led to better results than imposed external regulation in terms of both a reduction in extraction and the sustainability of the resource. Therefore, the co-management was the recommendatory policy for management methodology. With ITQs and IQ, there were no significant differences between them in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use; however, there were significantly less violation behaviors when ITQs were used than with IQ, as the ITQs provided more flexibility for fishermen who desired to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, ITQs are recommended as the best policy, although they need to be implemented with appropriate penalties.