We consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majority will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority committee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes.
CITATION STYLE
Aslan, F., Dindar, H., & Lainé, J. (2019). Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting. In Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing (Vol. 351, pp. 33–42). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_3
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