Although the search for human-like theory of mind (ToM) in non-human animals has continued unabated for almost 30 years, we have made very little progress in determining the psychological processes involved in non-human social cognition compared to the significant progress made in human infants. The underlying assumption that forms the basis for this research, is that ToM did not appear de novo in the evolutionary record of humans. Therefore, other animals, and most notably monkeys and apes, should at least demonstrate some of the precursors of socio-cognitive processing demonstrated by Homo sapiens. For example, there is good evidence that many animals follow another's line of sight to external objects (e.g. monkeys; apes; dolphins; domestic dogs; goats; seals; ravens; Grey parrots, see Emery 2000 for review). However, this ability need not be explained in mentalistic terms, as in many cases it may be purely reflexive (Povinelli and Eddy 1996). Indeed, this simpler explanation seems likely based on the generality of the behaviour, and the number of species in which it has been demonstrated. © 2008 Springer Japan.
CITATION STYLE
Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2008). How to build a scrub-jay that reads minds. In Origins of the Social Mind: Evolutionary and Developmental Views (pp. 65–97). Springer Japan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-75179-3_4
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