Nuclear Proliferation Races and Nonproliferation Bargains

Abstract

The perception of threat resulting from nuclear sharing can provoke retaliation in kind, resulting in a competitive nuclear proliferation race between donors.1 Nuclear sharing happens when states face incentives to share, and nuclear proliferation races happen when states fail to resist them. States may seek to infiltrate and roll back another state's sphere of influence, augment the strength of a neutral or ally whose remoteness might have led it to bandwagon with its adversary, or reinforce the strength of the members of an alliance. However, states anticipate actions and outcomes, and in certain instances they can bargain mutual restraints on nuclear sharing. Typically these bargains become possible when donor states have something to lose, usually because they become concerned with the arming of their enemies. States with nothing to lose will have no incentive to discontinue proliferating. There is little developed theory on proliferation races as they are rare, primarily because those that could have occurred have been arrested by joint state action. It is not at all certain that proliferation races have an equilibrium that is self-terminating and prone to bargains. Nonproliferation bargains provide a better explanation for why states forego nuclear sharing than the intervention model proposition that states seek to preserve their ability to intervene. This is principally because states will sacrifice their ability to intervene for improved security.