To grant decision-making to machines? Who can and should apologize?

0Citations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

Entering the specific domain of computational morality first requires considering the History of Human Morality and its various nuances. And noting and justifying the existence of multiple origins for the diverse moral systems, yet with a common matrix: that of being the result of our evolutionary History in such a realm, having survived Darwinian selection. Subsequently, it should be taken into account that, in addition to various moral geographies, there are several companies and countries involved in the construction of machines with moral programming requisites. Thus, in addition to moral algorithms per se, there is a need to devise international standards and constraining legislation leading to compliance with agreed standards. Inevitably, with so many agents in co-presence, errors, misjudgements and misunderstandings will emerge. Hence the particular importance of apology. Whether we are dealing with a biological, hybrid, or artificial agent, what matters is that decisions are justified by arguments, there is goodwill and absence of malice and that apologies are genuine and sincere.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Pereira, L. M., & Lopes, A. B. (2020). To grant decision-making to machines? Who can and should apologize? In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Vol. 53, pp. 113–120). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39630-5_16

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free