Securing the AES finalists against power analysis attacks

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Abstract

Techniques to protect software implementations of the AES candidate algorithms from power analysis attacks are investigated. New countermeasures that employ random masks are developed and the performance characteristics of these countermeasures are analyzed. Implementations in a 32-bit, ARM-based smartcard are considered.

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Messerges, T. S. (2001). Securing the AES finalists against power analysis attacks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1978, pp. 150–164). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44706-7_11

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