Comparing Contents with Information

Abstract

I first introduced my notion of logical content in 1988 and 1989. This was a broad concept providing the backbone for a style of algebraic semantics, called “content semantics”, and covering a wide range of logics from the weak relevant logic BBQ right through to the classical predicate calculus. This concept was subsequently specialized in 1996, in such a way as to help conceptualize a particular logic DJd. This specialized concept was extended to quantifiers in 2006, and was modified, jointly with Meinander in 2013, to form the logic MCQ. In this paper, we contend that contents are best represented as analytic closures, with the appropriate entailments captured by this logic MC of meaning containment. On the other hand, the term “information” has been widely used in logical work, usually as a means of underpinning or understanding a semantics of a logic or logics. Floridi in his book of 2011, contends: “semantic information is well-formed, meaningful and truthful data”. We pick up on this, by essentially adding the concept truth to that of contents to form information, appropriately chosen for its logical usage. We also divide information into two types: prime and non-prime information, and also determine their respective impacts on the proof theory and semantics of logical systems, with special interest in those of the relevant logics. We especially refer to the works of Carnap, Dunn and his former student, Mares.