From Deterrence to Cooperative Security on the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

The 2018 US-DPRK Singapore Summit introduced a new model to guide resolution of long-standing disputes on the Korean Peninsula: a “lasting and stable peace regime” could be created simultaneously with the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. This model established a continuum of objectives and milestone that extends as far as creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. An overlooked but critical obstacle to progress toward those objectives is the need to diminish the role of deterrence in inter-Korean affairs. Cooperative security, both as process and destination, is a useful concept for guiding the shift away from deterrence. Developing cooperative security necessitates deeper efforts than assumed in a peace regime to reduce aggregated offensive military capability. Beyond facilitation by the United States and China, the two Koreas have considerable agency to implement steps that alter their conventional military force balance and postures. Cooperative security can also help reduce the salience of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula by creating a conflict escalation firebreak, which can mitigate the risk that small-scale DPRK “tactical provocations” lead to major war, or even use of nuclear weapons. Inter-Korean initiatives are a critical complement to multiparty work on denuclearization and a peace regime, yet face several constraints from big power interests. Furthermore, pursuit of cooperative security is in basic tension with unification as the dominant framework for inter-Korean relations, such that continued emphasis on unification, especially in South Korean politics, is a likely impediment to progress.