Clientelism in local management. The case of the mayors in Chile 2015-2016

Abstract

The representatives are linked programmatically and not programmatically with their voters. They offer public policies and resolve demands of their constituents. On this last point, in Chile, the lobbying law obliges mayors to make public their direct relationship agendas with citizens, called "audiences". We analyzed 44,162 audiences for the 345 municipalities between 2015 and 2016. We conclude, first, that more than 80% of the audiences are associated with citizens' personal demands (non-programmatic audiences) and not with public policy requests (programmatic audiences). Second, in the year of local elections mayors grant more non-programmatic audiences, while in national elections year they grant more programmatic audiences. Third, that audiences are more recurrent in rural municipalities. Fourth, that the incumbent mayors make greater use of the mechanism, but they stop using it when they win the election by a large margin, the opposite being the case with the novice mayors.