Learning autoencoder ensembles for detecting malware hidden communications in IoT ecosystems

Abstract

Modern IoT ecosystems are the preferred target of threat actors wanting to incorporate resource-constrained devices within a botnet or leak sensitive information. A major research effort is then devoted to create countermeasures for mitigating attacks, for instance, hardware-level verification mechanisms or effective network intrusion detection frameworks. Unfortunately, advanced malware is often endowed with the ability of cloaking communications within network traffic, e.g., to orchestrate compromised IoT nodes or exfiltrate data without being noticed. Therefore, this paper showcases how different autoencoder-based architectures can spot the presence of malicious communications hidden in conversations, especially in the TTL of IPv4 traffic. To conduct tests, this work considers IoT traffic traces gathered in a real setting and the presence of an attacker deploying two hiding schemes (i.e., naive and “elusive” approaches). Collected results showcase the effectiveness of our method as well as the feasibility of deploying autoencoders in production-quality IoT settings.