Science Metaphysics and Structural Realism.

Abstract

Scientific realism is the view that we ought to believe that our best current scientific theories are approximately true and that their central theoretical terms successfully refer. Hence, if the theories employ terms that purport to refer to unobservable entities such as electrons, or gravitational waves, then, realists say, we ought to believe that there really are such entities having the properties and exhibiting the behaviour attributed to them. For many philosophers scientific realism is obvious and uncontroversial. Certainly, for example, in debates about physicalisln, reductionism and supervenience in the philosophy of mind, it is nonnally assumed by all parties that there are atoms, molecules, ions and so on; the question is whether that is all there is, or whether there are emergent, or causally autonomous entities and properties over and above the physical stuff. Scientific explanations throughout the physical but also the life sciences make essential reference to unobservable entities such as electromagnetic waves, nitrogen molecules and gravitational fields. Furthermore, there is a powerful argument in favour of scientific realism,