Towards a Phenomenology of Computation

Abstract

Uses a phenomenological perspective to argue that race is real even though its "reality" is contained in ontological outlines dependent on social practice. Reasons for current confusions about race are traced from early scientific classifications based on differences, suggesting that the integration of classification practices with a liberal ideology promoting pluralism resulted in contradictions about race that still exist. It is maintained that the three basic approaches to knowledge about race are nominalism, essentialism, & contextualism; the latter, including both objectivist & subjectivist forms, works best politically & metaphysically. A preliminary phenomenological explanation of racial identity suggests that it is experienced in the body of diverse racialized subjects at specific cultural moments, & the organization of perceptual practices stems from the domain of the visible as well as felt connectedness with others. It is contended that, although phenomenological descriptions can reactivate racist perceptions, they have the potential to reorient the positionality of consciousness. J. Lindroth.