Phenomenology

Abstract

The task of expounding Leibniz’s philosophy of space presents us with many conspicuous problems. The first and most important of them is that only in the very last years of his life did Leibniz develop an accomplished theory of space. In fact, however most of the issues we are concerned with here had been hinted at throughout Leibniz’s philosophical research, a really original rethinking of them only began in his mature years. As for a full theory of space, it only appeared in the late refinement of his metaphysical system, namely about the writing of Monadology and other essays of the period. The refinement and implementation of his monadological system seems indeed to have urged Leibniz finally to clarify and organize all his scattered thoughts on the nature of space. Certainly, it would be all too easy to recall the harsh controversy with Clarke on the absoluteness and substantiality of Newtonian space, and account by such a contingent reason for Leibniz’s not only expounding but even building his philosophical theory on the subject — which thus would only be a fortunate result of the insistences of the Princess of Whales. However, if only we read, in the lack of published philosophical treatises posterior to the New Essays, Leibniz’s letters from the decade 1704–1714 (particularly, the exchange with Des Bosses), we will easily realize how increasingly he felt urged to give a framework to his thoughts on the connections between space and substances, matter and extension, mathematics and metaphysics.