Valuing Reprogenetic Technologies: Bringing Insights from the Philosophy of Technology to Bioethics

Abstract

Reprogenetic technologies have been enthusiastically embraced by well-known authors who argue that these technologies increase reproductive choice, contribute to a reduction of suffering by eliminating genetic diseases and disabilities, and offer the opportunity to improve the human condition by creating beings who will live much longer and healthier lives, have better intellectual capacities, and enjoy more refined emotional experiences. Indeed, some take reprogenetic technologies to be so valuable to human beings that they believe their use is not only morally permissible but morally required. More often than not, however, proponents of reprogenetic technologies treats these technologies as mere value-neutral tools, limiting their assessments to risk and benefit considerations. In this chapter I bring insights from philosophy of technology regarding the value-laden nature of technologies to bear on bioethical analyses of reprogenetics. I challenge proponents’ assumption that an evaluation of risk and benefits is all is needed to determine the moral permissibility or impermissibility of developing and using reprogenetic technologies. I argue that a robust ethical analysis requires attention to the relationship between contextual values and technological development and implementation, as well as to the ways in which technologies reinforce or transform human values by mediating our perceptions of the world and our reasons for action. Ignoring the value-laden nature of reprogenetic technologies results not just in incomplete ethical evaluations but in distorted ones.