Cosmological natural selection and the function of life

Abstract

I propose an adaptationist theory of cosmological natural selection with intelligence (CNSI) that corrects an apparent error in Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection (Smolin’s CNS). Smolin’s CNS is a mostly reasonable extension of speculative yet conventional cosmological ideas, such as that we live in a multiverse and that black holes generate new universes by leading to big bang-like events. It extends these ideas by noting that if some universe types were particularly capable of producing new universes that were similar to themselves (i.e. at reproducing), then they would become particularly well represented in the multiverse; in other words, universes may evolve via Darwinian selection. Smolin’s CNS seems to err, however, in identifying black holes as the aspect of the universal ‘phenotype’ that is most likely to constitute an adaptation for universe reproduction. The error stems from overlooking what could be considered the ‘first law of Darwinian adaptation’: aspects of a phenotype that exhibit more improbable complexity are more likely to be adaptations. Because intelligent life exhibits higher improbable complexity (and therefore lower entropy) than black holes, it is more likely than black holes to be an adaptation for universe reproduction. From this perspective, biological evolution would represent a developmental subroutine of cosmological evolution, and the ultimate function of intelligent life would be to develop the knowledge and technology that would ultimately enable the universe to reproduce. This simple adaptationist correction to Smolin’s CNS produces a CNSI theory which more thoroughly explains the existence of complexity in our universe, because it directly accounts for not just non-biological order but biological order as well. Scientifically, the adaptationist framework of CNSI could be useful for facilitating conceptual integration between biology and physics. Philosophically, this framework is notable especially for implying that life serves a fundamental ‘purpose’ and that ‘moral progress’ can be objectively, if only broadly, defined.