Global faults on cryptographic circuits

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Abstract

Methods of injecting faults in a laboratory are numerous and varied. We divide the state of the art in methods of injecting faults in electronic circuits into two categories. The first is global attacks, which disturb all the equipotentials of a netlist simultaneously. The second is local attacks, which target a more specific zone of the components’ surface, rear or front. Global attacks are a less accurate method of injecting faults but require a much lower budget. This chapter further discusses the specifics of global versus local faults. Then, it provides models for global faults and demonstrates that most theoretical fault attack constructions can be obtained in practice by means of global fault injection. To illustrate this, we provide an extensive characterization of fault models by emulation (FPGA) on application-specific devices (ASICs). Finally, this chapter ends with an exhaustive survey of the experimental means of injecting global faults and their effect as a critical path setup time violation phenomenon.

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APA

Guilley, S., & Danger, J. L. (2012). Global faults on cryptographic circuits. In Information Security and Cryptography (Vol. 17, pp. 295–311). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29656-7_17

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