Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory

Abstract

Anne-Marie Slaughter’s application of so-called ‘liberal’ theory to international law leads to questionable descriptions of how ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ states behave, as well as equally questionable prescriptions for how international rule-making ought to proceed in the future. Treaties exclusively between parties whose governments respect human rights, the market, and periodic elections are not necessarily more likely to be characterized by ‘deep’ cooperation enforced via binding dispute settlement; liberal courts have ample reasons to resist (as well as to enforce) international obligations. Contrary to what this version of liberal theory would suggest, compliance with all forms of international legal obligations, including those within international economic law, may not fall along ‘liberal’/‘non-liberal’ lines. Liberal norm-making prescriptions, including overly optimistic assessments of regulation via ‘transnational networks’ and ‘transjudicial communication’ and unduly grim assessments of more pluralist alternatives, shrink the domain of international law in misdirected, probably counterproductive, pursuit of the ‘liberal peace’. 1