Kernel rootkits are among the most insidious threats to computer security today. By employing various code injection techniques, they are able to maintain an omnipotent presence in the compromised OS kernels. Existing preventive countermeasures typically employ virtualization technology as part of their solutions. However, they are still limited in either (1) requiring modifying the OS kernel source code for the protection or (2) leveraging software-based vir-tualization techniques such as binary translation with a high overhead to implement a Harvard architecture (which is robust to various code injection techniques used by kernel rootkits). In this paper, we introduce hvmHarvard, a hardware virtualization-based Harvard architecture that transparently protects commodity OS kernels from kernel rootkit attacks and significantly reduces the performance overhead. Our evaluation with a Xen-based prototype shows that it can transparently protect legacy OS kernels with rootkit resistance while introducing < 5% performance overhead.© Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2010.
CITATION STYLE
Grace, M., Wang, Z., Srinivasan, D., Li, J., Jiang, X., Liang, Z., & Liakh, S. (2010). Transparent protection of commodity OS kernels using hardware virtualization. In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Vol. 50 LNICST, pp. 162–180). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16161-2_10
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