Firms' conjectures about demand are consequential in oligopoly games. Through agent-based modeling of consumers' search for products, we can study the rationing of demand between capacity-constrained firms offering homogeneous products and explore the robustness of analytically solvable models' results. After algorithmically formalizing short-run search behavior rather than assuming a long-run average, this study predicts stronger competition in a two-stage capacity-price game. © 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Ruebeck, C. S. (2011). Consumer search, rationing rules, and the consequence for competition. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6589 LNCS, pp. 155–162). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19656-0_24
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