Beyond kernel-level integrity measurement: Enabling remote attestation for the android platform

Abstract

Increasing adoption of smartphones in recent times has begun to attract more and more malware writers towards these devices. Among the most prominent and widely adopted open source software stacks for smartphones is Android that comes with a strong security infrastructure for mobile devices. However, as with any remote platform, a service provider or device owner needs assurance that the device is in a trustworthy state before releasing sensitive information to it. Trusted Computing provides a mechanism of establishing such an assurance. Through remote attestation, tc allows a service provider or a device owner to determine whether the device is in a trusted state before releasing protected data to or storing private information on the phone. However, existing remote attestation techniques cannot be deployed on Android due to the unique, vm-based architecture of the software stack. In this paper, we present an attestation mechanism tailored specifically for Android that can measure the integrity of a device at two levels of granularity. Our approach allows a challenger to verify the integrity of Android not only at the operating system level but also that of code executing on top of the vm. We present the implementation details of our architecture and show through evaluation that our architecture is feasible both in terms of time complexity and battery consumption. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.