In this paper we extend Saari's geometric approach to paradoxes of preference aggregation to the analysis of paradoxes of majority voting in a more general setting like Anscombe's paradox and paradoxes of judgment aggregation. In particular we use Saari's representation cubes to provide a geometric representation of profiles and majority outcomes. Within this geometric framework, we show how profile decompositions can be used to derive restrictions on profiles that avoid the paradoxes of majority voting. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Eckert, D., & Klamler, C. (2009). A geometric approach to paradoxes of majority voting in abstract aggregation theory. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5783 LNAI, pp. 14–25). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_2
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