Study of land price game equilibrium and countermeasure based on combination selling style regulation

Abstract

Land as the important element of house has the huge influence of the house price. But the policy of local government and land nature trait result in the failure of land market and land value invalidation. So government should regulate the land price and let the price back to the rational level. This paper from the point of all kinds of interest sides gamed the land price. Analyze the land selling style and the elasticity of land price regulation to search the efficient price regulation in real estate market. In the ground of land market, government, local government and developer have the different utility and object which result there are three sides in the land game. And the Nash equilibrium indicates that central government should take optimized combination supply method to regulate the land price to stabilize the house price. And local government should apply with the policy of central government to realize the utility hypo-optimize. The game between local government and enterprise about the selling of land, only to take the combination Optimized land selling method and increase the weight of biding can reach the purpose of regulating the land price. © 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.