Abstract
In this survey we present some recent advances in the literature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic questions that we are interested in have to do with the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the efficiency of their construction when they exist, as well as the gap of the best/worst (mixed in general) Nash equilibria from the social optima in such games, typically called the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability respectively. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
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CITATION STYLE
Kontogiannis, S., & Spirakis, P. (2005). Atomic selfish routing in networks: A survey. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3828 LNCS, pp. 989–1002). https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_100
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