Neural correlates of causal power judgments

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Abstract

Causal inference is a fundamental component of cognition and perception. Probabilistic theories of causal judgment (most notably causal Bayes networks) derive causal judgments using metrics that integrate contingency information. But human estimates typically diverge from these normative predictions. This is because human causal power judgments are typically strongly influenced by beliefs concerning underlying causal mechanisms, and because of the way knowledge is retrieved from human memory during the judgment process. Neuroimaging studies indicate that the brain distinguishes causal events from mere covariation, and also distinguishes between perceived and inferred causality. Areas involved in error prediction are also activated, implying automatic activation of possible exception cases during causal decision-making.

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APA

Cummins, D. D. (2014). Neural correlates of causal power judgments. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8(DEC). https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.01014

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