Uncovering 'the political' in political psychology

Abstract

In this paper I prepare the ground for a realist political psychology by drawing on recent methodological debates between moralists and realists about the place of empirical facts in normative political theory. To anchor the discussion, I focus on Jonathan Haidt's social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral and political judgment, an empirically grounded theory that has risen to prominence over the last decade. I argue that the SIM does not, as Haidt presumes, present a substantive challenge to rationalist normative philosophy. What is needed is a more critical framework; accordingly, I examine the SIM in relation to political realism, especially the work of Bernard Williams. However, any such alliance must involve a reckoning with realism's critical theory commitments, directed in particular toward Haidt's interpretation of his empirical findings. These discussions create the space for a realist political psychology, which balances the demand for empirical reflection with the philosophical sophistication of existing political theories.