AGENCY PROBLEMS AS A DRIVER FOR CRIME IN THE AEC-INDUSTRY

Abstract

The paper seeks to outline agency problems as a fundamental driver for crime occurring in the AEC industry. The investigation uses Principal/Agent-theory to articulate how specific industry mechanisms serve as structural drivers of crime and how they can be counteracted. This paper is conceptual, based on former empirical investigations-the approach springs from industry knowledge, extensive literature reviews and empirical research. The research reveals that little discussion has been carried out concerning the root causes of criminal activity within the AEC industry. Widespread theoretical insights from economics and criminology can explain significant parts of the challenges. Production control efforts seem to be an auspicious path for combatting crime. Being under-analysed to such a degree as identified, the theoretical conditions for criminal activity within the AEC industry needs more in-depth consideration. This need for further exploration especially concerns the implications of criminal activity on advanced process-driven production systems approaches. Establishing effective countermeasures depends heavily on such an understanding.