The Relativity of Knowledge

Abstract

The three central themes of epistemological relativism are the relativity of truth, knowledge and reality. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the relativity of truth could be given a well-founded formulation by setting truth claims in relation to context and points of view—without renouncing the concept of an objective truth. In this chapter, I will examine the relativity of knowledge in regard to justifying it. The traditional theory of knowledge is individualistic, while viewpoint relativism leads to communal epistemology, where knowing is always in relation to a community. I will begin my analysis from the classical concept of knowledge, which can be considered the basic definition for the concept of objective knowledge. By problematising it, we can arrive at such a definition of objective knowledge that is compatible with viewpoint relativism. It is incompatible with the realistic interpretation of knowledge. I will discuss pluralism related to justifying knowledge, and this will lead me to epistemic viewpoint-relativism, where epistemic systems are viewpoint-dependent. An example of this is the dispute over the heliocentric model (does the Earth revolve around the Sun, or vice versa?). This case leads us to the question of the incommensurability of frameworks; it is argued that incommensurability does not concern local frameworks. At the end of the chapter, I will consider whether Wittgenstein could be considered an epistemic relativist.