Abstract
We present new attacks on key schedules of block ciphers. These attacks are based on the principles of related-key differential cryptanalysis: attacks that allow both keys and plaintexts to be chosen with specific differences. We show how these attacks can be exploited in actual protocols and cryptanalyze the key schedules of a variety of algorithms, including three-key triple-DES.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Kelsey, J., Schneier, B., & Wagner, D. (1996). Key-schedule cryptanalysis of IDEA, G-DES, GOST, SAFER, and triple-DES. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1109, pp. 237–251). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_19
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