Pleasure Makes Pro-attitudes

Abstract

Donald Davidson famously argues that when a person acts for a reason, we can characterize that person as having some sort of pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind and believing that their action is of that kind. If acting for a reason must be caused by pro-attitudes, then the right account of pro-attitudes will help us correctly identify cases of action for reason. In this paper, we examine what it takes for a mental state to be a pro-attitude. First, we argue that having any mental state that systematically causes behavior when combined with an appropriately connected belief count as a pro-attitude is overly permissive. We do so by presenting an example of someone whose complex system of nervous tics mimics the causal structure of a pro-attitude, but where the resulting behavior does not count as action. Next, we argue that requiring beliefs about value or treating pro-attitudes as perceptions of value is overly restrictive. Such views fail to account for akrasia or attribute unprecedented functional properties to perceptual states. Finally, we propose an account of pro-attitudes that avoids these pitfalls: In addition to causing behavior, pro-attitudes cause more pleasure when one thinks about attaining their object than when one thinks about failing to attain their objects.