Decision problems for nash equilibria in stochastic games

8Citations
Citations of this article
7Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with ω-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we single out several decidable restrictions of the problem. First, restricting the search space to stationary, or pure stationary, equilibria results in problems that are typically contained in PSpace and NP, respectively. Second, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with a binary payoff (i.e. an equilibrium where each player either wins or loses with probability 1) is decidable. We also establish that the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a certain binary payoff entails the existence of an equilibrium with the same payoff in pure, finite-state strategies. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ummels, M., & Wojtczak, D. (2009). Decision problems for nash equilibria in stochastic games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5771 LNCS, pp. 515–529). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04027-6_37

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free