This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer's communitarian version and Brian Orend's prudential one. I investigate first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that a version of Walzer's doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend's version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Sandin, P. (2009). Supreme emergencies without the bad guys. Philosophia, 37(1), 153–167. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9145-5
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