In this chapter, I claim that, in what relates to their putative argumentative character and assessment, the lot of well-known thought experiments (in both Science and Philosophy) is similar to that of the classical fables, as analyzed elsewhere (Olmos 2014). The short, condensed and schematic narratives provided by either classical fables or thought experiments carry an argumentative potential that can be (and in fact has been) variously used as basis for construing arguments according to different schemes in different settings. We have to analyze and assess each real concrete “argument in use” as pertaining to its own argumentative aims in its own context and try not to prejudge the form (analogy or other) it is going to take. Moreover, our analysis and our assessment of such “narrative arguments in use” would be, typically, argumentative practices themselves, in which our interpretation and our positive or negative appraisal of their relative strength will be, typically and preferably supported by reasons, and could be likewise contested.
CITATION STYLE
Olmos, P. (2017). On Thought Experiments and Other Narratives in Scientific Argument. In Argumentation Library (Vol. 31, pp. 193–213). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56883-6_11
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