Abstract
We propose a logic for describing the interaction between knowledge, preference, and the freedom to act, and their interactions with the norms of Priori and a Posteriori rationality, which we have argued for in previous work [3]. We then apply it to strategic games to characterise weak dominance and Nash equilibrium. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Guo, M., & Seligman, J. (2013). The logic of Priori and a Posteriori rationality in strategic games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8196 LNCS, pp. 218–227). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_17
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