The cognitive neuroscience of metamemory monitoring: Understanding metamemory processes, subjective levels expressed, and metacognitive accuracy

Abstract

Metamemory has been broadly defined as knowledge of one's own memory. Based on a theoretical framework developed by Nelson and Narens (Psychol Learn Motiv 26:125-141, 1990), there has been a wealth of cognitive research that provides insight into how we make judgments about our memory. More recently, there has been a growing interest in understanding the neural mechanisms supporting metamemory monitoring judgments. In this chapter, we propose that a fuller understanding of the neural basis of metamemory monitoring involves examining which brain regions: (1) are involved in the process of engaging in a metamemory monitoring task, (2) modulate based on the subjective level of the metamemory judgment expressed, and (3) are sensitive to the accuracy of the metamemory judgment (i.e., when the subjective judgment is congruent with objective memory performance). Lastly, it is critical to understand how brain activation changes when metamemory judgments are based on different sources of information. Our review of the literature shows that, although we have begun to address the brain mechanisms supporting metamemory judgments, there are still many unanswered questions. The area with the most growth, however, is in understanding how patterns of activation are changed when metamemory judgments are based on different kinds of information.