Consequences of the transcendental-pragmatic consensus theory of truth

Abstract

The theory of transcendental pragmatics proposed by Karl-Otto Apel has been embroiled in ongoing disputes owing to its strong assertions, including its notion of ultimate grounding. Such grounding should be achieved through the unhintergehbar (uncircumventable) conditions of our argumentative discourses. This chapter focuses on another of these controversial assertions, the consensus theory of truth, which has also been subject to criticism. In well-known attempts, both Wellmer and Putnam regard transcendental pragmatics as a kind of anti-realism, although my own opinion is that there is limited validity to their criticisms. However, rather than directly responding to them, I leverage these criticisms for the purpose of clarifying the transcendental-pragmatic notion of truth and illustrating its relevance to ultimate grounding, with the end result that these criticisms will become less compelling.