Embedded finance: the shadow banking system, sovereign power, and a new state–market hybridity

Abstract

With the rise of the shadow banking system, a new form of state–market hybridity has emerged, challenging existing monetary approaches to financial stability. A stable financial system today has essentially come to depend on a stable shadow banking system. Central banks are in the process of adapting to this new development. To secure the logic of laissez-faire market liberalism, the sovereign must resort to unprecedented measures and radically intervene in the financial markets. This new form of state–market hybridity forces central banks to provide ample reserves, to act as a dealer of last resort, and to give shadow banking actors access to their balance sheets. Such policies, however, produce new contradictions and fragilities. Based on Foucault's concepts of sovereignty and security, this paper argues that in today's world, the rationality of the laissez-faire security dispositif has become flanked by the rationality of sovereignty to a much greater extent than previously. Without losing its dominant status, the security dispositif is currently adapting so as to operate in crisis mode based on a post-laissez-faire rationality. The repo crisis of 2019 has demonstrated that central banks are still in the process of searching for ways to handle this new constellation.