Public procurement and corruption during Covid-19: self-monitoring and whistleblowing incentives after Srebrena Malina

  • Teichmann F
  • Falker M
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Abstract

Crises and emergencies tend to increase opportunities for corruption in public procurement. This article shows how the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to new corruption opportunities and how regulators are trying to combat these, using the example of the case of the Bosnian raspberry firm Srebrena Malina. The literature review concludes that prevention mechanisms focus on the legal and regulatory aspects without considering firms’ perspectives. In contrast, an approach based on summary content analysis may help firms develop potential self-monitoring solutions that they can apply to ensure compliance with anti-corruption regulations and avoid sanctions. Explorative expert interviews with ten international compliance experts are also conducted. The findings illustrate that whistleblowing incentives could foster compliance with existing regulations and policies in public procurement. This article advocates a more consequential implementation of the current anti-corruption and public procurement regulations alongside self-monitoring measures in the form of whistleblowing incentives.

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APA

Teichmann, F., & Falker, M.-C. (2021). Public procurement and corruption during Covid-19: self-monitoring and whistleblowing incentives after Srebrena Malina. SEER, 24(2), 181–206. https://doi.org/10.5771/1435-2869-2021-2-181

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