Cryptanalysis of the ansi x9.52 cbcm mode

Abstract

In this paper we cryptanalyze the proposed (almost accepted) ANSI X9.52 CBCM mode. The CBCM mode is a triple-DES CBC variant which was designed against powerful attacks which control intermediate feedbacks for the benefit of the attacker. For this purpose, it uses intermediate feedbacks that the attacker cannot control, choosing them as a keyed OFB stream, independent of the plaintexts and ciphertexts. The attack we describe finds a way to use even this kind of feedback for the benefit of the attacker. It requires a single chosen ciphertext of 265 blocks and 258 complexity of analysis. We also describe an adaptive known-IV related-key attack which find one of three 56-bit keys requiring one known plaintext encrypted under 233 different but related keys with 257 complexity of analysis.