Misdirection and misconception in the scientific realism debates

Abstract

The scientific realism debates have been plagued by misrepresentations of both realist and empiricist positions, sometimes by their adherents as well as by their critics. When positions are presented as contraries, there must be an isolatable question to which each gives its answer, in opposition to the other. Since philosophy does not provide a way to answer factual questions about the world, that common question must be about the character of science and scientific practice, rather than about what there is. Once what is at issue has been clarified, realists and empiricists can cooperate on an inquiry into what science is, what the criteria of adequacy are in scientific practice, and what epistemic or doxastic attitudes toward scientific theories are within the bounds of reason. In this inquiry, the writings of Weyl, Glymour, and Suppe provide an excellent guide. Just what is scientific realism, and what are its contraries? Despite, or perhaps because of, the many formulations of such positions that are found in the literature, it is not as easy to answer this as it might seem.