Improved differential attacks on RC5

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the strength of the secret-key algorithm RC5 newly proposed by Ron Rivest. The target version of RC5 works on words of 32 bits, has 12 rounds and a user-selected key of 128 bits. At Crypto’95 Kaliski and Yin estimated the strength of RC5 by differential and linear cryptanalysis. They conjectured that their linear analysis is optimal and that the use of 12 rounds for RC5 is sufficient to make both differential and linear cryptanalysis impractical. In this paper we show that the differential analysis made by Kaliski and Yin is not optimal. We give differential attacks better by up to a factor of 512. Also we show that RC5 has many weak keys with respect to differential attacks. This weakness relies on the structure of the cipher and not on the key schedule.