Abstract
This paper studies the security of the block cipher ARIA against impossible differential cryptanalysis. We find a new impossible differential property of ARIA, and propose an attack against ARIA-256 reduced to 7 rounds based on this property, while previous attacks can only attack ARIA up to 6 rounds. Our new attack needs 2125 chosen plaintexts and 2238 7-round encryptions. This is the best result for impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA known so far. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Du, C., & Chen, J. (2010). Impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA reduced to 7 rounds. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6467 LNCS, pp. 20–30). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_2
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