This article examines the process of judicial selection in Russia. It discusses the main institutional mechanisms of judicial selection and appointment, which have developed after the reforms of the 1990s. Firstly, the paper analyses the work of judge qualification boards, and the role of the presidents of the courts in the constitution of the judiciary. Second, the article examines two models of judicial selection. The first is the meritocratic model, which is based on the principle of merit: the most qualified lawyers are selected. The second is the bureaucratic model, in which the career of a judge starts immediately after graduation. The empirical analysis is based on 957 biographies of candidates for judicial position, published on the qualification board web pages in 2014-2015. The analysis of these biographies shows that candidates are predominantly women, and seventy percent of candidates obtained legal experience in the court apparatus. The article uses logistic regression to model the appointment results. It reveals several patterns of appointment. First, meritocratic factors are taken into account by qualification boards. Candidates who have a good legal education receive a slight advantage in selection. Second, the analysis shows that unconditional priority in the selection is given to candidates who have gained legal experience in public sector either in the court apparatus, the prosecutor's office or in governmental bodies. Those who worked as lawyers in business organizations or the bar have less chance of being recommended by qualification boards. Finally, the models show that court presidents play a key role in the selection of judges. The patronage of court presidents increases the chance of recommendation by fifty percent. This has a significant impact on the structure of the judiciary because it promotes a bureaucratic professional culture and reduces the independence of the judiciary.
CITATION STYLE
Dzmitryieva, A. (2019). The patronage of court presidents as a success factor in the selection of judges by qualification boards. Zhurnal Issledovanii Sotsial’noi Politiki, 17(3), 391–406. https://doi.org/10.17323/727-0634-2019-17-3-391-406
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.